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A BILL TO DECLARE THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGES OF HINDU WOMEN AFTER PUBERTY.

WHEREAS it is expedient to remove doubts as to the validity of marriages of Hindu women after puberty and to declare such marriages valid; It is hereby enacted as follows:—

1. This Act may be called the Hindu Post-Puberty Marriage Act, 191 .

2. It shall apply to all persons governed by the Hindu Law who are domiciled within the Presidency of Madras.

3. Notwithstanding any custom or any text or rule of Hindu Law to the contrary, no marriage of a women governed by the Hindu Law, whether performed before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that, at the time of the marriage, she had attained puberty.

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS.

Among Brahmans in South India except the Nambudris and among certain sections of non-Brahman Hindus the present custom is to marry girls before puberty. The general belief among them is that the Sastras forbid the marriage of a girl after puberty. It is true some *Smritis* like those of Parasara, Yama and Samvarta disapprove of such a marriage and even denounce the bridegroom and the bride as well as the guardians of the latter. But they do not go so far as to declare that the marriage of a girl who has attained puberty is invalid in law or that the children born of such a marriage are illegitimate. On the other hand, many *Smritis* of at least equal sanctity like those of Manu, Gautama, Yajnavalkya, Baudhayana and Vasishtha, while enjoining on parents and guardians the duty of giving away girls in marriage before puberty, allow them a further period of three years within which to do so and provide that after the three years they may themselves seek suitable bridegrooms. The well-known *Smriti* of Narada only lays down that the parents of a girl should

lose no time after puberty in marrying her. The authors of the *Grihya Sutras*, which are of equal authority with the *Smritis* and which are of higher value as evidence of early custom, seem to contemplate only post-puberty marriage, for, with trifling exceptions, they prescribe cohabitation or physical union between the parties on the fourth night as a part of the *Vivaha* or marriage sacrament. For these and other reasons it is believed by many Hindus that post-puberty marriage, so far from being forbidden by the Sastras, has their clear sanction and in fact was at one time the prevalent custom. Some of these Hindus would like to marry their girls after puberty, as it might enable these to receive education somewhat longer and also materially diminish the risks of early widowhood. They hope besides that, if this reform be firmly established, the condition of women in general may become better and the qualities of the race improve in due time. But the state of the law on the subject is a difficulty in the way of the reform. Some lawyers think that a post-puberty marriage is valid according to Hindu law. Among these may be mentioned the late Mr. V. Krishnaswami Ayyar, who wrote in 1906: "It is certain that no court of law can now declare invalid any marriage which takes place after the puberty of the bride in the highest Hindu caste." The contrary opinion was held by Sir T. Muttuswami Ayyar, who observed in *Venkatacharyulu* v. *Rangacharyulu*, XIV Madras: "It must be remembered that the ritual is prescribed for a minor or a child, for, according to Hindu Law and custom, a Brahmin girl must be married before she attains her maturity and, therefore, at a time when she is not in a position to choose a suitable husband for herself." In this conflict of opinions as well as of texts there is reason to fear that, if a post-puberty marriage be challenged in a court of law, it may be declared invalid and any children born of it rendered illegitimate. In a recent pamphlet entitled "The position of Hindu Social Reform Associations" Sir C. Sankaran Nair has said under the heading of Post-Puberty Marriage: "We therefore seek a reform on these national lines and, as we are doubtful whether a marriage after puberty will be recognized by courts of law as a valid marriage, we want a measure of permissive legislation to declare that, even if marriages take place after puberty among those classes who have been following the contrary practice, such

marriages will not be invalid, but will be treated as legal and valid in courts of law." It is therefore expedient to declare by an enactment of the legislature that no marriage between Hindus shall be deemed invalid by reason merely of the fact that the bride had, at the time of the marriage, attained puberty. The Bill does this and no more. It is purely permissive and, even in the liberty that it allows, it does not depart from the basic principles of the Hindu marriage sacrament. And of course it does not interfere with the present custom or in any way restrict the freedom of those that desire to conform to it.

V. S. SRINIVASAN.

NOTES OF ENGLISH CASES.

Board of Management of Trim Joint District School *v.* **Kelly**, (1914) A. C. 667.

A schoolmaster while engaged in the performance of his duties was assaulted by two of his pupils in pursuance of a pre-concerted plan and was killed. The mother of the deceased applied for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The question was whether it could be said that the accused met his death by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

The majority of their Lordships held that he did, but Lords Dunedin, Atkinson and Parker dissented.

In this case, the Lord Chancellor explains the principle of the Act to be one more akin to insurance at the expense of the employer of the workman against accidents arising out of and in the course of his employment than to the imposition on the employer of liability for anything which he might reasonably have foreseen and prevented.

The majority held that the term accident was used not in any special sense but in its popular sense which was wide enough to recover the act of the pupils.

The minority were of opinion that the injury was not by accident but by design and therefore did not come within the Act.

Lloyd *v.* **Powell Dufferyn Steam Coal Company,** (1914) A. C. 733.

In this case their Lordships held that statements made by a deceased person to the effect that a child was his and that he intended to marry the mother before the child was born is admissible both on the issue of paternity and on the issue of dependency (the case being one under the Workmen's Compensation Act) as evidence of the state of mind of the deceased in relation to the child. An illegitimate child may be a dependant within the meaning of the Act.

British Electric Railway Company *v.* **Vidlet Gentile.** (1914) A. C. 1034.

The Families Compensation Act of British Columbia which is practically the same as Lord Campbell's Act provides like the latter that actions thereunder should be commenced within 12 months of the death of the deceased. The question was whether this period was cut down by a special clause in the Consolidated Railways Act (which applied to the deceased) that suits for indemnity for any damage or injury sustained by reason of the Tramway or Railway should be brought within 6 months of the damage. Their Lordships hold that it was not. Though the right of the family was derivative in the sense that no action would lie unless the deceased had at the time of his death a cause of action, the right was quite an independent right in other respects and limitation commenced only from his death. Their Lordships mention release and limitation among circumstances that will prevent the accrual of a cause of action in favour of the family.

Norton *v.* **Lord Ashburton,** (1914) A. C. 932.

In this case their Lordships authoritatively lay down that *Derry* v. *Peek* [1], does not preclude actions for compensation for loss arising from misrepresentation made in breach of a special duty imposed by the Court by reason of the fiduciary relation existing between the parties *e. g.*, solicitor and client as in this

1. (1889) 14 App. Cases. 337.

case though actual fraud is negatived. The mere fact that fraud is alleged but not proved or is found against is not ground for refusing relief on the footing of the other allegations in the plaint which set forth an actionable breach of duty.

Though the action is laid in fraud, the Court may give leave to amend when the action, it is found should have been for negligence.

When the Court of it first instance which had the witnesses before comes to the conclusion that no fraud is made out, it is a rash proceeding on the part of the appellate Court to interfere with that finding and find fraud.

It is the duty of a solicitor when in any particular transaction his private interest comes into conflict with that of his client to decline to act professionally for him and insist upon his employing another solicitor.

In re **Mayne : Stanham** *v.* **Woods**, 1914 2 Ch. 115.

Will—Construction—Bequest of securities "Standing in my name"-Foreign Government bonds to bearer—Whether included in the bequest.

Testatrix made a bequest of "all the stocks, shares, debentures, debenture stock and other securities which shall be *standing in my name* at my decease" to Paul Woods. The testatrix died being entitled to two Japanese Government bearer bonds; the bonds were purchased at the instance of the testatrix by her Bank. They were kept by the Bank and entered in a book kept by the bank for entering securities lodged by the customs for safe custody. They were kept in an envelope with the name of the testatrix on it.

Held the bearer bonds do not pass by the bequest. They are not securities standing *in the name of the testator.*

In re **Ceruption Vaughan** *v.* **Smith**, 1914 2 Ch. 119.

Will—Construction—Specific legacy bequeathed as "as a general not as a specific legacy"—Abatement.

A testator gave among other legacies a specific legacy of stock, bonds and shares as "general and not specific legacy." The estate was insufficient to pay the legacies in full. *Held*, the

above mentioned legacy must abate with general legacies and must be taken at its value at the expiration of a year after the testators death; and the legatee is not entitled to income at the interval.

English *v.* **Cliff**, 1914, 2 Ch. 376.

Perpetuities—Settlement—Trust to arise "at the expiration of twenty one years" from the date of settlement.

The settlor, by a settlement dated 13th May 1892 assured a freehold estate to the trustees and directed that they should stand possessed of the said hereditaments during the term of twenty one years from the date thereof upon trust to pay the rents and profits in the manner therein mentioned and it was thereby declared that "the said trustees or trustee shall, at the expiration of the said term of twenty one years, sell the said hereditaments and premises hereby conveyed" and stand possessed of the sale proceeds upon certain trusts therein declared. In pursuance of the trust for sale, the original trustee, put up the property for sale by auction on the 20th June 1913 when the defendant purchased the same. The trustees brought this action for specific performance against the defendant who refused to complete the purchase on the ground that the trust for sale was void as infringing the rule against perpetuity.

Held, the limit laid down by the rule against perpetuity must, where there are no life or lives in being to be taken into account arise not later than twenty one years from the date of its creation. "The only sensible view to be taken of such a limitation, as in the present case, is that the term determines and the trust arises at the very same moment of time and if looked at in that way it is impossible to say that the trust arises at a later priod than that allowed by law;" and the trust for sale is consequently not void.

In re **Harris : Davis** *v.* **Harris**, 1914 2 Ch. 395.

Administration—Executor's rights of retainer—Breach of trust by testator—One of the executors concurring in the breach—Debt resulting from—Another executor appointed trustee after death—Administration of Estates Act (Hinde Palmer's Act) 1869—Right of retainer against speciality creditors.

The testator and one of the executors under his will were trustees of a settlement and the testator as such trustee committed a breach of trust in which the executor concurred whereby loss was caused to the beneficial estate. After the testator's death, the plaintiff, the other executor under the testator's will was appointed trustee of the settlement with the other executor who continued to be trustee. The plaintiff took out a summons to determine the right of retainer of the executors for the loss caused to the beneficial estate by the breach of trust as against specialty and simple contract creditors.

Held. As regards the executor who concurred in the breach of trust, he would be debarred from suing the testator in his life time or any of his legal representatives after his death, for damages occasioned by the joint test. The right of retainer is personal to the trustee; and the beneficiaries cannot be in a better position than the trustee. So the executor can have no right of retainer for the breach of trust.

The plaintiff though he was appointed trustee of the settlement after the testasor's death is entitled to retain for the loss caused to the beneficial estate.

In re Barret [1] followed.

After Hinde Palmer's Act, the right of retainer is available equally against specialty and simple contract creditors.

In re **British Red Cross Balkan Fund British Red Cross Society** *v.* **Johnson** 1914 2 Ch. 419.

Trust—Resulting trust—Subscriptions raised for a particular purpose—Fund collected not exhausted—Right of subscribers for return of inexpended balance—Rule in Clayton's case—Applicability of.

Large sums were subscribed from time to time for assisting the sick and wounded in the Balkhan War; and the fund was duly applied from time to time for the objects contemplated.

At the end of the war, there was an unexpended balance left, which admittedly belonged to some or all of the subscribers by way of resulting trust. On a question raised as to which of the subscribers were entitled to return of the balance and in what proportion.

1. 43 Ch. D. 70.

Held. The rule in *Clayton's Case* [1] as re-stated by Lord Halsbury L. C. in *The Mecca* [2] that " where an account is kept between the parties as a banking account, there is no room for any other appropriation than that which, arises from the order in which, the receipts and payments take place and are carried into the account. Presumably it is the sum first paid in that is first drawn out. It is the first item on the debit side of the account, that is discharged or reduced by the first item on the credit side ; the appropriation is made by the very act of setting the two items against each other " is a mere rule of evidence and not an invariable rule of law. In the present case, the rule is inapplicable ; and the balance belongs to all the subscribers in proportion to their subscriptions.

CONTEMPORARY LEGAL LITERATURE.

"The Crown, the Public and the Individual" is the title of a learned article in the Juridical Review for September in which the writer deals comprehensively with the privileges of the Crown in a conflict with the rights of the individual or the public. Where the prerogative of the Crown is involved the Crown is not bound unless it is tortious to press the Crown's claim or it is bound by some Act of Parliament *eo nomine* or by necessary implication. The principal rights of the Crown which are entitled to precedence over the rights of the public or the individual are rights connected with (1) ownership (2) occupation (3) user of property (4) a freedom from the interference of local authorities (5) the right to shield its deliberations from the gaze of others. The Crown will be bound though not expressly named where the statutes declare certain things to be against reason or public policy or to be in advancement of justice or purport to deal with the fundamentals, of religion or morality or the express concurrence of the Crown is set out.

Where the construction of a statute is doubtful, the construction most favourable to the Crown will be adopted. In the construction of taxing statutes however a contrary rule is generally adopted. The Crown is not bound by any coercive statutes, or

1. 1 Mer. 572, 608. 2. (1897) A. C. 286, 290.

proceedings nor by indifferent statutes. The Crown may take advantage of all Acts relating to legal procedure but is not bound by them nor by Acts cutting down remedies. For instance an act taking away the right to a certiorari was held not to bind the Crown.

Another article of interest in that journal deals with "equity." The writer says that notwithstanding the fascination that pure equity has for the young lawyer, as one grows older in the profession, the conviction is borne in upon him that there is more probability of justice being done by impartial administration of even unjust but certain laws than by a Judge dealing with the case according to his own conceptions of right and wrong. According to Domat, the true function of equity is this If the hardness or the rigour of the law is not an essential element of its jural character and is not inseparable from its application, equity prefers the more moderate interpretation, Equity may also be legitimately resorted to, to supply the deficiencies of law.

In the Law Quarterly review for July and October, Professor Harrison Moore discusses the justification for the prevalent notion that public authorities are liable for misfeasance and not for nonfeasance. The difference between the two cases is according to him due to the fact that at common law nonfeasance did not ordinarily give rise to a cause of action while misfeasance or malfeasance did and the rule that public authorities are liable for the one and not for the other only emphasises this fact. But a public authority cannot plead exemption under cover of the rule if it has constructed an artificial work and does not take the proper precautions nor does the rule exempt it from the ordinary duties of an owner of property where it is one. Nor has the rule any application where the public authorities are engaged in a business only in substitution of private enterprise and the ordinary law of tort imposes liability in case of omission if the defaulting party were a private person. The principal meaning of the rule is that a party will not be entitled to sue for damages because a public body does not perform the duty imposed upon it merely because an indictment will lie for the breach of the duty, when the duty is one cast upon it not in return for some franchise or privilege but without any return, for the benefit of the public.

Lord Sumner's Judgment in *Ibrahim* v. *The King* [1], has led Mr. Ernest Williams to discuss the advisability of legislature pointing out specifically the circumstances under which confessions might be used. Though the writer apprehends some danger to the accused from such a course, somewhat akin to that from operation of the Criminal Evidence Act permitting the accused to give evidence having regard to the failure of the terrifying predictions of Best as to the effect of questioing the accused, he does not believe that it is likely to be as serious as some people apprehend.

Mr. Wyndham Bewes questions the correctness of the Judgment in Velasquey *v.* Inland Revenue Commissioners denying locality to debts. He thinks that their locus is where a suit upon them can ordinarily be brought. He points out that debts are recognised to have a locus for purposes of probate proceedings.

"The Legal and Political unity of the empire" is the subject of an address by Mr. J. H. Morgan. The credit of bringing about legal unity within the empire belongs to the Privy Council. As all the early Charters to colonies contained a clause reserving the supreme jurisdiction of the King and required the law to be not repugnant to the laws of England, the Privy Council exercised a healthy check as an appellate authority by declaring statutes to be *ultra vires* and laying down the right law. The High Court also was active in doing justice beyond the seas. Chancery dealt with matters overseas by claiming jurisdiction to act in personam. The King's Bench claimed authority to deal with the wrongs committed abroad by a fiction as to Venue. The colonies were treated as only extensions of the counties of Middlesex, York and so forth. The writ of *habeas corpus* can be issued to any portion of the Kings dominions where it cannot be had from the local Courts and even where it can be had there is the right of appeal. The tendency of the colonies to cut down the right of appeal is likely to affect the position of the Privy Council as a Court of appeal. But it is having extended usefulness in other directions, as the interpreter of constitutions.

1. (1914) A. C. 599.

Mr. J. B. Edwards discusses the effect of a certificate of naturalisation as a British subject. He controverts the position that naturalised subjects have the rights and privileges of British subjects only within the united Kingdom. He thinks that though outside the United Kingdom they may not be entitled to the privileges of natural born British subjects the position is not that of an alien, that they are entitled to all the privileges of British subjects except in so far as a distinction is made between a natural born British Subject and a naturalised British Subject. Incidentally he discusses the status of the children of such naturalised subjects and thinks that if they are born outside the allegiance, in their father's place of origin, they cannot have the status of natural born subjects.

Mr. Gadsby, John gives some valuable notes on the Japanese criminal Procedure. The peculiarity of the Japanese procedure is the secret preliminary examination where the accused is not permitted the services of counsel. The value of evidence is determined in the free exercise of the discretion of the Judges. Under certain circumstances, trials may be re-opened at the instance of the relatives after the death of the accused. The era of great Righteousness (Taisho) as the present regime is called is contemplating further improvements in the rules of procedure enacted in the era of meiji or enlightened Government of the late Mikado.

Professor Randall discusses the position of Bartolus as a jurist. He considers him the father of private International law. He elaborated the doctrine of the *personality* of law *i. e.*, the rule that in matters personal (status and capacity) the citizen carried with him the law. He belonged to an essentially practical school.

In the Canadian Law Times for September, Mr. Silas Alward gives an account of the contributions of the English Justinian (Edward I) to the development of law. He remodelled the courts by substituting for the itinerant Aula Regis, the Kings' Court in its 3 divisions King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer. He started the system of Assizes. By his statute of Westminister, he codified the laws then prevalent with suitable modifications. His statute of Winchester organised a system for the preservation of peace and the apprehension of offenders. The ordinance for the

Government of the City of London is no less remarkable. The writ of Quo Warranto drafted by his great Lord Chancellor Robert Burnell was passed into law in the 18th year of his reign. The absurd uses to which this writ was sometimes put is illustratrated by Henry VIII's issue of it against St. Thomas Beckett for usurping the title of saint and a formal declaration that he was not a saint and that people should not esteem him as such. He was the founder of the first free parliament which was the model Parliament for-long time. The publication of Year Books began in the twentieth year of his reign. The term "common law" came into use during this time.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PROVINCIAL INSOLVENCY ACT *By Mahim Chandra Sarkar* 1914 *Published by Rai M.C. Sarkar Bahadur and Sons.*

Yet another book from the pen of Mr. Mahim Chandra Sarkar, Retired Sub-Judge and author of Civil Procedure, Evidence and Specific Relief Acts and as usual with him well done. The difference between the insolvency provisions of the old C. P. C. and the provisions of the present act are clearly pointed out. As the Indian Act is more or less moulded on the English Bankruptcy Acts, reference is given to the corresponding provisions of those acts and the English cases that explain them. The respectable body of case law that has already grown up around the numerous sections of the act is carefully digested. The Rules are printed in appendix. We have no doubt that the book will be found useful by the profession.

BENCH AND BAR DIARY (1915) *Published by Rai M.C, Sarkar Bahadur and Sons.*

A nicely bound diary with a lot of useful information pertaining to the daily routine of lawyers, Court-fees, stamp duties, periods of limitation &c. The pages are sufficiently big for all ordinary purposes.

THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW *By Robert McMurdy.*

This is an address by the President of the Illinois Bar Association. It is an appeal to the Legal profession to devise means to put an end to that blot on American civilization *viz.*, lynching. He proposes the passing of a uniform law requiring the executive in each state to suppress lynching with the strong hand of the law.

SYNOPSIS OF HINDU LAW and MAHOMEDAN LAW *By H.C. Sen. B. A., Vakil, Lucknow.*

We confess we are not in favour of books like these but so long as their publication cannot be prevented, it is something to have accurate ones like the one before us. A curious feature of the book, perhaps indicative of the practical importance of the study of Mahomedan Law in the province from which the book comes Mahommedan Law takes up a larger part of the book than Hindu Law.

THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION (*treated historically and comparatively*) *by Pherozeshah N. Daruvala LLD. (Lond.) Bar-at-law, Advocate, Bombay, published by Butterworth and Co. (India) Ltd.* 1914. *Price Rs.* 15 *net.*

Looking at the work from the point of view of the student of comparative law, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Beaman, in an appreciative 'Foreword', describes the book as 'unique' and observes that it is not too much to say that the subject has never yet been so thoroughly exhausted. We may be permitted to say that in many respects the praise is well deserved. We do not pretend to a sufficient knowledge of the innumerable systems of law dealt with in the comparative section to be able to form a full estimate of the merits of this portion of the work ; but that need not prevent us from appreciating the high purpose of the author, the extent of his labours and the utility of the work. In so far as it deals critically and comparatively with the law as

it now stands in England, in India and in the United States, the book is bound to be useful even to the average busy practitioner.

The second chapter deals at length with the history of the doctrine of consideration in the English law. It is of course not untrodden ground, but the author has done a valuable service in bringing together in a form so easily accessible to the Indian reader, the materials made available by more than half a century of historical research and criticism. The numerous extracts from the Year Books and other early authorities calculated to give a clear idea of the development of the forms of action and the results of the conflict of jurisdiction between the King's Courts and the Ecclesiastical Courts and again between the Courts of Common Law and Courts of Equity, constitute a special feature of the book. As to the precise extent to which the indigenous and the Roman systems have respectively contributed to the doctrine of consideration as at present obtaining in the English Law, we shall not presume to dogmatise where eminent authorities differ. The author refers to the views of many of them and we may well await further light before accepting any conclusion as final. Chapter III is devoted to a study of the doctrine as prevailing in England at the present day. The law is stated in the form of a number of rules, the text of the book being arranged as a commentary, both critical and historcial, on the rules thus stated. From ch. IV begins what may be called the comparative portion of the work, Chapters IV to VI deal with the law on the subject as obtaining in British India, some of the English colonies and the United States respectively. Chapters VII to XII relate to the several Romanic systems distinguished by the doctrine of 'causa' as understood in the Roman law. Under this group come the Scotch and the Roman-Dutch laws, the laws of France, Italy, Belgium, Spain and Portugal and many of the South American States. Ch. XIII to XIX bring together several systems of law, such as those of Germany, Japan, Austria, Russia and the Ottoman Empire and the ancient Jewish and Babylonian laws under which mere offer and acceptance are said to be sufficient to create a binding contract and there is nothing corresponding to the English doctrine of consideration or the French doctrine of cause. In every one of these chapters, the law under each

system is stated in the form of a number of rules expanded and explained by the text and in appropriate places attention is drawn to the difference between the rules of the English law and the rules under the foreign system. A portion of each chapter is devoted to a short examination of the bearing of the theory of consideration on the Law of Property. The Bibliography and the comparative tables at the end greatly add to the usefulness of the work. Needless to say, the get up of the book leaves nothing to be desired.

THE LAW OF MORTGAGE IN INDIA. *By Dr. Rash Behary Ghose, M. A., D.L. Vol. II, Fourth Edition* (1914) *Published by Thacker Spinck & Co.*

This is the second volume of Dr. Ghose's well-known work on the Law of Mortgage in India. It contains the relevant portions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Civil Procedure Code with notes which are brought up to date. Dr. Ghose's work is too well-known to require any commendation from us. The get up of the book is excellent.

PRIZE COURT PRACTICE & PROCEDURE *By R. J. Wickham Hurd L.L.B.* (1914).

This is a brief nevertheless lucid account of the practice and procedure of Prize Courts. The subject has emerged from oblivion in consequence of the present war and there is a real need for a book of the kind.

STUDENTS' GUIDE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN INDIA. (1914) *By Aleu Kinnney, Published by Messrs. Thacker Spinck & Co.*

Prepared after the manner of Fraser on Torts, this book is likely to be found useful by students. The subject is carefully analysed. We have no hesitation in recommending it to the student population especially as it is not likely to supersede the bigger text-books but will only be useful as an aid to memory.

THE SOLICITOR'S CLERK. *By Mr. Charles Jones. Sixth. Edition revised and enlarged. Published by Effingham Wilson, London.*

The object of the author was to produce a thoroughly practical handbook for the every day use of solicitor's clerks. While not neglecting to set out clearly and distinctly the leading principles of law governing the various subjects dealt with the author has given just those little details of practice which escape notice in the large Standard text-books. Chapters I to IV deal with Magisterial Law and Practice, Chapters V and VI with licensing Law and Practice Chapter VII with affiliation proceedings Chaps VIII with as sisting a debtor to prepare his statement of affairs in Bankruptcy, Chapter XI with Solicitor's Book-keeping and XII, XIII with keeping Trust accounts. A glossary of legal maximsis given at the end. [*The End*]. The book is sure to be found useful not only by the Solicitor's clerks for whom it is meant but also by others in whose line of business, that sort of work lies.

[*The End of Vol. 27.*]